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Abstract  
Practitioners with limited security resources lack appropriate guidelines when protecting 
targets against mass-casualty attacks. Existing guidelines about prioritization between 
targets and protective security measures are either very abstract or consist of roughly 
collected advice. Combining game theory with practically oriented literature, such as 
situational crime prevention, crime scripts and crime prevention through environmental 
design, this dissertation establishes a systematic framework for prioritizing between targets 
and measures and provides concrete policy recommendations (given certain assumptions 
about motivation). I argue that:   
1. If terrorists cannot be deterred from attacking, strategic authorities will ensure that 
the terrorists attack well-protected targets. Protection is desirable not only when it 
deters the terrorists from attacking, but also when it causes the terrorists to target 
sites that are less rather than more damaging for the authorities. 
2. When protecting against mass-casualty attacks, the authorities should give priority 
to potential targets with a high expected number of casualties, many foreigners, 
low employee density, many hiding places, many access points, high anonymity, 
high share of earlier attacks, and high system fragility.  
3. When protecting against explosive attacks on railway networks, the best protective 
security measures focus on limiting the damage caused by an explosive attack, 
rather than on reducing the probability of an attack’s being successful.  
4. By thinking counter-terrorism when designing railway carriages, we may 
significantly reduce the expected damage caused by explosive attacks on railway. 
Many of this dissertation’s models generate interesting empirically testable implications. 
Unfortunately, lack of appropriate data prevents proper testing of these empirical 
implications as well as testing of assumptions underlying the models; available datasets do 
not distinguish between attacks where the terrorists seek mass-killings and attacks where 
they do not. My policy recommendations are, furthermore, less concrete because of the very 
generic depiction of the terrorists in my models. To refine these recommendations, more 
knowledge is needed about what resources and capabilities terrorists possess. 
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Background 
 
Just after the train left Edgware station, there was a massive bang followed by 
two smaller bangs and then an orange fireball. I put my hands and arms over my 
ears and head as the windows and the doors of the carriage shattered from the 
blast. Splintered and broken glass flew through the air towards me and other 
passengers. I was pushed sideways as the train came to a sudden halt. I thought I 
was going to die. Horrific loud cries and screams filled the air, together with 
smoke, bits and chemicals.1
  
 
In this way, John, a survivor of the 7/7 London attack, describes his experience when 
the Edgware Road bomb went off. The 7/7 London attack caused 52 killings, 
approximately 700 injuries (London Assembly, 2006a: 6) and extensive damage to 
the three trains and the bus targeted in the attack. The track in the three tube 
locations was also damaged, but no tunnel sections collapsed (Transport for London, 
2005b). The tube was totally closed down, causing large transportation problems for 
everyone travelling in London that day. The day after, all the unaffected lines were 
reopened, while the Circle and Piccadilly lines were not properly restored until four 
weeks later (Transport for London, 2005a, 2005c). Except for transport disruption, 
the economic consequences for businesses were rather small (London Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 2005). Many people, however, suffered from post-traumatic 
stress (BBC news, 2010), and a significant share of London residents suffered from 
‘substantial stress’ 7 months after the attack (Rubin, et al., 2007).  
Mohammad Sidique Khan, the alleged ring leader, describes his motivation for the 
attack in his video testament (The Stationary, 2006: 19): 
 
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities 
against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you 
directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and 
                                                 
1 London Assembly (2006b) p. 4. 
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avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be 
our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and 
torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a 
soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation... 
 
In the above extract, Khan explains why he considers all civilians legitimate targets.  
Many terrorist attacks seemingly aim to produce fear, publicity and indiscriminate 
mass killings (Al-Hakaymah 2008; Lia 2003; Lia 2008; Tønnessen 2007). The 
London attackers did not limit the number of killings by notifying the government 
about the bombings. They furthermore carried the bombs themselves, ensuring that 
the bombs would not be discovered and rendered harmless before detonation. One of 
this attack’s main immediate purposes was accordingly to cause mass-killings, where 
the immediate purpose of causing mass-killings (and fear) can be interpreted as a 
means to frighten the population into forcing the politicians to withdraw UK forces 
from Muslim countries.  
 
Research questions 
When securing against terrorism, the authorities must reduce other expenditures 
correspondingly, for instance, spending on traffic safety, schools or health services. 
Security resources are thus limited and should be prioritized so as to make the most 
of them. The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a framework to determine how 
the authorities should prioritize between both targets and protective security 
measures when preventing mass-killings. Research questions include:   
1. How can we determine whether terrorists consider security measures 
implemented when selecting targets? 
2. How should the authorities prioritize between targets when protecting them 
against terrorist attacks?  
3. How should the authorities prioritize between security measures when 
protecting the railway against explosive attacks?  
4. How should an explosion-resistant railway carriage be designed? 
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These questions vary from the very general and abstract to the very specific and 
concrete, which reflects the fact that my dissertation (and writing process) can be 
characterized as a funnel: Paper 1 discusses question 1; I formulate four abstract 
models and deduce empirically testable implications from these. Paper 2 answers 
question 2 building on formal models while also translating abstract implications into 
concrete policy recommendations. I furthermore compare these policy 
recommendations with actual allocations in transport. Paper 3 satisfies question 3; 
here I discuss how to prioritize between concrete security measures in the railway 
while building on the logic from papers 1 and 2. Paper 4 responds to question 4, 
discussing the practical problem on how to design an explosion-resistant railway 
carriage. This dissertation thus consists of four papers, plus the introduction. 
Studies in situational crime prevention have shown that different categories of 
crimes (and terrorism) exist, and that each category should be analyzed separately 
(Clarke & Newman, 2007). This dissertation focuses on terrorists that attack to 
achieve some immediate effect2
Bjørgo, 2011
, where the wanted effect can be killings, material 
damage, disruption, media coverage etc. I also limit this dissertation to protective 
security measures, including measures such as passenger screening, target hardening, 
and closed-circuit television. I ignore measures that are not target specific, such as 
building and maintaining normative barriers against criminal actions and efforts to 
hunt down and detain terrorists before or after they have committed violent acts 
( ). I furthermore focus on economic (and sometimes operational) costs 
of implementing security measures, ignoring important considerations such as 
privacy, mobility and other restrictions of freedom.  
The framework I develop can be employed to all types of terrorism, but when 
employing it to produce concrete implications and policy recommendations; I need 
to restrict the study even further. When necessary, I limit the discussion to mass-
casualty attacks because (1) human casualties and serious injuries are extremely 
expensive for society and (2) the likelihood of casualties and injuries grows when 
                                                 
2 Terrorists that do not care about the effect of attacking are even more difficult to predict while at 
the same time probably not as dangerous (they will often choose targets that are too well 
protected to actually achieve any significant effect). 
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terrorists actually want to cause mass-killings. What is more, one relatively easy way 
to attract attention and trigger mass hysteria is to cause large numbers of deaths (Lia 
2003: 8). 
Public transport constitutes an attractive target for terrorists seeking to cause 
mass-killings; public transport sites are both crowded and easily accessible. Several 
of the deadliest attacks in European history have, furthermore, targeted passenger 
traffic on railways (Lia & Nesser, 2005: 37–38). Railway can thus be an attractive 
target for terrorists seeking to cause mass-killings by using guns, other small arms, 
explosives,3 or unconventional weapons4 Clarke & Newman, 2006: 109–110 ( ). 
Explosives are particularly attractive; they can damage structures and bring down 
buildings, as well as kill people. Furthermore, media coverage of bombings is 
considerably more graphic than coverage of, say, a shooting (Clarke & Newman, 
2006: 109).  
 
Plan for the introduction 
Section 2 reviews the literature on prioritization in protective security and shows 
how this dissertation contributes to this literature. Section 3 discusses this 
dissertation’s research strategy, including the formal models and the empirical 
analysis, and section 4 four accounts for how the papers relate to each other. Section 
5 presents paper summaries, and, finally, section 6 sums up this dissertation’s major 
findings and limitations.  
 
  
                                                 
3 Explosives here include both high explosives and low explosives. See Petropouleas (2009: 3-4) for 
definitions. 
4 Unconventional weapons include Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. 
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Literature review 
The literature on counterterrorism and optimization is vast, ranging from simple risk 
analysis,5
Aven, 
1998: 5
 where the probability of an attack is exogenous, to game-theoretic models 
where the protection level influences the probability of an attack. In risk analysis, the 
probability is usually estimated from the historical frequency of the event (
),  a method which is, owing to the relatively low frequency of terrorist 
attacks, unsuitable for estimating the probability of terrorist attacks. Powell (2007b: 
528–530) furthermore demonstrates how using exogenous probabilities against a 
strategic adversary produces a suboptimal security allocation. Allocating security 
resources to a site has two effects: it reduces the probability that an attacker will 
target this particular site and it reduces the probability that an attack on this site will 
succeed. Simple risk analysis typically includes the second effect, but not the first. 
Hence, simple risk analysis tends to overestimate the optimal security allocation to 
the target that is most likely to be attacked when all targets are unprotected.  
The above account demonstrates the necessity of considering how terrorists adapt 
after observing security measures implemented before determining the optimal 
allocation. The rational choice approach can be an appropriate tool owing to the 
theoretical coherence, the fruitful simplification6
Geddes, 2003: 205
 and its capacity to explain puzzling 
outcomes and generate non-obvious solutions ( ). Game-theoretic 
models are furthermore specifically designed to help us understand the phenomena 
that we observe when decision-makers interact. Such models assume that decision-
makers take into account their knowledge or expectations of other actors’ behaviour 
when pursuing exogenous goals (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994: 1).  
Several scholars have made important contributions to the game-theoretic 
literature on defender’s optimal security allocation (Bier, 2007; Golany, Kaplan, 
                                                 
5 The risk of an event is the probability of the event multiplied by its consequence. 
6 The restrictive assumptions empower the observer to make deterministic predictions about behavior. 
Geddes (2003: 189-90) illustrates this by comparing rational choice arguments with if-then statements: “if 
the actors have the goals the observer claims, and if the information and calculation requirements are 
plausible (…), and if the actors actually face the rules and payoffs the observer claims they do, then certain 
behavior will occur.”   
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Marmur, & Rothblum, 2009; Hausken, 2006; Powell, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Sandler & 
Lapan, 1988). Bier (2007) and Powell (2007b, 2008) analyze the optimal security 
allocation when the defender has full information about the attacker’s preferences. 
They demonstrate that, up to a point, it is optimal for the defender to allocate all its 
security resources to the site the attacker most prefers to target. When the defender 
has invested enough resources at the attacker’s most-preferred target to make the 
attacker indifferent between targeting the two most-preferred sites, then the defender 
should divide the next resources equally between these two targets. When the 
attacker becomes indifferent between targeting the three most-preferred sites, the 
defender should divide the next resources equally between these three targets, and so 
on.  
Defender’s optimal strategy might, however, be different if the defender can 
withhold information about the allocation. Zhuang and Bier (2007) model the 
defender’s use of secrecy. Their analysis shows that when full information exists 
about the defender’s preferences, the defender always prefers to reveal the security 
allocation truthfully. However, when the defender has private information, certain 
situations exist where secrecy and/or deception may be preferred by the defender to 
mimic a defender that are of less interest to the attacker.  
 Powell (2007a) shows that when only the defender is aware of the targets’ 
vulnerability (the probability of an attack on each target succeeding), the allocation 
of security resources to the targets may be treated as signals about the sites’ 
vulnerabilities. The need for secrecy about vulnerability overrules the need for 
securing vulnerable targets when sites that are more vulnerable are slightly harder to 
protect “on the margin”. The defender may therefore divide its resources equally, 
regardless of the vulnerability level.  
The above game-theoretic literature on defender’s optimal security allocation have 
interesting implications, but most so at a very general and abstract level. Authorities 
working on target protection need more concrete advice, advice that can be found in 
the more practically oriented literature I account for below.   
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“Security  is deliberate action to reduce the risk of criminal events, taken before, 
during or after the event” (Ekblom, 2011: 97). Societies have been implementing 
security measures for all known history, measures that do anything from dealing out 
punishment to offenders to building walls to keep potential offenders away. Security 
can be further refined into four distinct approaches (Ekblom, 2011: 97):  
1) Primary security either eliminates the possibility of an unwanted event or 
reduces the probability that such an event will happen. An example is 
passenger screening to decrease the probability of an explosive being 
smuggled into a target area.  
2) Secondary security limits harm if the unwanted event occurs. An example is 
installing blast-resistant glass that does not form damaging fragments in an 
explosion. 
3) Tertiary security limits propagation of harm that may occur post-event. An 
example is use of fire-resistant materials in the carriages’ inventory to prevent 
fires ignited by an explosion.  
4) Mitigation attempts to repair the harm that has already been done. An 
example is rebuilding damaged buildings after a successful attack.   
This dissertation focuses on target-specific security measures implemented before 
the criminal event, namely 1–3.  
The situational crime prevention approach focuses on specific crime categories 
and seeks to change the immediate environment, such that potential offenders either 
are physically prevented from committing the crime or perceive the opportunities as 
reduced and the risk as increased, and thus might choose against committing the 
specific crime (Clarke, 1983: 225; Ekblom, 2010). Clarke and Newman (2006: 189–
195) apply situational crime prevention measures for  protecting targets against 
terrorism, including explosive attacks. They propose: increasing the effort by closing 
off streets and building walls and barriers; increasing the risks of being caught by 
strengthening surveillance through CCTV, citizen vigilance and hotlines; and 
reducing the offender’s rewards by making the buildings more explosive-resistant 
and designing public spaces to reduce injuries from bombs.  
10 
 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) specifically 
emphasizes the process of designing security into the built environment/architecture 
(Atlas, 2008: 3). Contributors concentrate on physical measures against explosive 
attacks in general (Atlas & DiGregorio, 2008; FEMA, 2003, 2007, 2008; Garcia, 
2008; Petropouleas, 2009). CPTED-measures include everything from measures 
preventing progressive structural collapse (incorporating more columns in the design, 
strengthening floor systems, strengthening un-reinforced masonry walls and shaping 
the buildings optimally) (FEMA, 2008: 3-23 to 3-29), via measures preventing 
damage from fragments (glazing, securing walls, securing non-structural debris and 
other facade retrofits) (FEMA, 2008: 3-10 to 3-23), to measures facilitating 
evacuation (designing good evacuation routes, signing them clearly and installing 
emergency lighting).  
The above contributions provide many excellent suggestions for security 
measures, while mostly ignoring the implementation cost. A few contributors 
acknowledge that authorities have limited resources available: If the standoff is large 
and vehicles cannot approach the premises, the need to secure against structural 
collapse in case of a vehicle-borne explosive attack decreases and vice versa. The 
optimal trade-off between standoff and structural robustness depends on the price per 
square metre (Petropouleas, 2009). Increasing blast resilience is furthermore much 
cheaper when implemented in the design phase than when implemented later 
(Aibara, 2010).  
Other contributors suggest relatively cheap measures. Since nine out of ten deaths 
in explosions are caused by flying glass (Phillips, 2010), measures that prevent glass 
fragmentation is a relatively cheap way of reducing the number of injuries caused by 
an explosion. Intelligent use of people that already frequents the transport system are 
furthermore a relatively cheap way of enhancing security, training of both security 
personnel and civilian staff, and support of passenger vigilance (Jenkins, 2001: 14–
17). In the UK railway’s strategy for dealing with unattended items, passengers are 
told specifically to keep their belongings with them and report to a staff member 
when seeing anything unattended. The front line staff is trained to employ the ‘HOT’ 
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protocol7
Dwyer, 2010: 6–7
, and police officers receive both training and regular intelligence updates 
( ). 
In summary, there is a huge gap in the literature between very formal game 
theoretic contributions that have precise, but very abstract implications, and the more 
hands-on contributions that largely produce ad hoc advice. This dissertation aims to 
bridge this gap by combining formal theory, such as the above game-theoretic 
literature, with more practically oriented contributions, such as the situational crime 
prevention approach, to produce concrete policy recommendations for relevant 
authorities. 
  
                                                 
7 HOT stands for: is the item Hidden? Is it Obviously suspicious in appearance or placement? Is it Typical of 
lost property? (Dwyer, 2010: 21) 
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Research strategy 
This dissertation encompasses four papers, all which apply formal models, directly 
or indirectly, to generate concrete policy recommendations for authorities securing 
targets against terrorist attacks. Paper 1 employs four models to investigate target 
selection by terrorists and to deduce empirically testable implications. Paper 2 
employs two of these models to explore how the authorities should allocate security 
resources between targets. I deduce implications and translate them into policy 
recommendations that are compared to data collected through interviews with 
Norwegian transport authorities. Paper 3 applies one of the above models to 
prioritize between security measures against explosive attacks in railway networks.  
Paper 4 combines the reasoning from paper 3 with the language of the so-called 
Security Function Framework to explore the specific practical design problem of 
securing railway carriages against explosive attacks. 
 
Formal models 
Why use formal models? According to Snidal (2004: 227) “mathematics provides a 
precise language to describe the key elements of a problem, a powerful deductive 
machinery that extends the logical power of our theories, and an important means to 
expand our understanding and interpretation of the world.” Employing mathematics 
thus both clarifies and facilitates deduction from a theoretical argument. 
Mathematics has, however, also limitations; formal modelling often requires 
restrictive assumptions, assumptions which must be properly justified in each case.  
All this dissertation’s models can, to varying degrees, be characterized as rational 
choice models. Rational choice models use the individual, or some analogue of the 
individual, as the unit of analysis and treat the individual’s goals as exogenously 
given. They furthermore assume that individuals, given their knowledge about 
strategies, costs and benefits, select the alternative that maximizes their expected 
utility. Structural characteristics determine the set from which individuals may 
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choose their strategies and the costs and benefits associated with each strategy 
(Geddes, 2003: 179).  
Rational choice arguments suffer, however, from some limitations. A good 
rational argument depends on both the goals’ plausibility and the analyst’s ability to 
identify these goals a priori. According to Geddes (2003: 180–1), rational choice 
argument tends to be less persuasive when the goals are more idiosyncratic. When 
the actors have unusual goals, exploring the origin of these goals can be more 
interesting than constructing a rational choice argument which explains the 
behaviour given these goals. She furthermore claims that goals should not be directly 
inferred from observed behaviour because the rational choice argument then turns 
into mere tautology (Geddes, 2003: 181).   
I actually use rational choice arguments to explore behaviour by individuals with 
rather idiosyncratic goals, terrorists. Other scholars focus, however, on 
understanding the ideologies behind terrorist behaviour, such as jihadism, and/or 
focus on terrorist recruitment8
Two of this dissertation’s models are game theoretic. The distinctive feature of 
game-theoretic models is “that actors are interdependent so that each actor’s outcome 
depends in part on the other’s behaviour” (
. Terrorism has such high impact that, even if it is 
characterized as a rather marginal phenomenon, exploring the behaviour seems 
useful.  
Snidal, 2004: 247). Kydd (2004: 346) 
claims that the field of security studies is especially suited for game theory. The 
number of actors is usually small and the stakes involved are high. Practitioners of 
world politics, furthermore, often have extensive experience with the relevant issues 
(Kydd, 2004: 347–8). Is game theory suitable for studying terrorism? The number of 
possible terrorist cells is obviously vast and, as shown in paper 2, the authorities do 
not act like a unitary actor. However, modelling terrorism as a game between a 
terrorist cell and the authorities is fruitful when the purpose is generating policy 
recommendations for the authorities. The actors consider the outcome important; the 
authorities want to minimize mass-killings and, since the terrorists may not get a 
                                                 
8 See for instance Hegghammer (2006) and Lia (2008). 
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second chance (because they can either be killed in the attempt or have high risk of 
being caught), the terrorists want to maximize the effect of the attack, including 
causing mass-killings. Few authorities and terrorists, however, have lots of 
experience with terrorism. Few states have experienced terrorist attacks and very few 
terrorists stay free to commit new attacks after committing serious terrorist attacks in 
Western countries. The main argument against using game theory on terrorism is 
thus many actors’ lack of experience.  
 
This dissertation’s models 
In this section I discuss the purpose of this dissertation’s models. 
This dissertation analyzes six different models, of which paper 1 considers four. In 
model I both the authorities and the terrorists act strategically. Strategic authorities 
seek to minimize damage from mass-casualty attacks while taking into account how 
implemented security measures affect both the terrorists’ choice of target and their 
investment in an attack. Strategic terrorists, in selecting their target and attack 
investment, seek to maximize casualties, given the security measures implemented 
by the authorities. In model II only the terrorists act strategically, meaning that the 
terrorists’ choice of target and attack investment depends on how the authorities 
protect the various sites, while the authorities ignore the terrorists’ target selection 
process when allocating security measures. Finally, in models III and IV the 
terrorists do not act strategically; they simply select the targets likely to have the 
maximum number of casualties without considering how the authorities’ security 
measures affect the probability that the attack will succeed. In model III the 
authorities minimize damage while taking into account that the terrorists do not act 
strategically, while in model IV the authorities ignore the terrorists’ target selection 
and attack investment processes when allocating security measures. 
Because paper 2 aims to establish what influences the authorities’ optimal security 
allocation (rather than the terrorists’ target selection, as in paper 1), it ignores the 
cases where the authorities act non-strategically. Furthermore, in paper 2 paper 1’s 
models I and III are replaced by models V and VI to better suit paper 2’s purpose. 
16 
 
Unlike models I and III, models V and VI treat the probability of an attack’s being 
successful as independent of the cost of attacking (the attack investment). Model V 
resembles model I, but treats the cost of attacking as exogenously given and constant 
across targets. Like model III, model VI assumes that only the authorities act 
strategically and that Nature (chance) decides with exogenous probabilities the 
terrorists’ choice of target. In model VI these exogenous probabilities vary between 0 
and 1. In contrast, in model III they are either 0 or 1. 
Table 1 categorizes the six models according to whether the authorities and the 
terrorists are assumed to be strategic or non-strategic. 
 
Model I
Model V Model II
Model III
Model VI Model IV
Strategic
Strategic
Non-strategic
Non-strategic
Terrorists
Authorities
 
Table 1: The six models 
 
Models as normative standards 
Many formal models are based on unrealistic assumptions about how the actors act 
(Hovi & Rasch, 1996: 114–6). These models set a normative standard for the actors, 
rather than describing their actual behaviour. 
Four of the models I consider can be seen as normative standards for how the 
authorities should act. Models I, III, V and VI all assume that the authorities act like 
a unitary and rational actor to minimize casualties. Interviews with Norwegian 
transport authorities actually indicate that they neither act like a unitary actor nor 
allocate resources purely to minimize casualties; other non-security considerations 
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contribute heavily to the aggregate allocation. These four models should thus be 
interpreted as normative standards for the authorities.  
 To aid the authorities when protecting targets against mass-casualty attacks, I 
explore target selection by terrorists. An adverse effect of this exploration, very 
difficult to avoid, is that I also establish how the terrorists should act. Models I, II 
and V assume that the terrorists also act like a unitary actor while maximizing benefit 
given available information. Whether these assumptions are realistic or not, models I, 
II and V demonstrate how the terrorists can maximize utility. These models could 
thus also be interpreted as normative standards, although only for effect-seeking 
terrorists.  
Consequently, models I, II, III, V and VI can be seen as normative standards, 
either for only the authorities (models III and VI), or for only the terrorists (model 
II), or for both (models I and V).  
 
Models as conceptual explorations  
Some models do not support any claim about the real world; they focus on 
‘conceptual exploration’ rather than ‘empirical theorizing’ (Sugden, 2000: 9). The 
scholar investigates the model’s internal properties without considering its empirical 
relevance. Even if the ultimate purpose of model-building is to learn about the real 
world, conceptual explorations can be valuable; they can improve existing theory by 
either (1) establishing simpler formulations, (2) discovering useful theorems within 
these theories, or (3) discovering inconsistencies. Additionally, a model can 
sometimes explain empirical phenomena in completely different domains than the 
scholar had in mind when developing the model (Sugden, 2000: 8–10). 
This dissertation’s models, especially models I and V, rely heavily on existing 
game-theoretic contributions while simultaneously extending this literature by 
varying assumptions about strategic behaviour. In addition to the game-theoretic 
models where both actors act strategically (models I and V), I consider one model 
where the terrorists are assumed to act strategically while the authorities’ allocation 
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of resources is non-strategic (model II), two models where only the authorities act 
strategically (model III and VI), and one model where both actors act non-
strategically (model IV). I furthermore deduce implications about terrorists’ target 
selection or the authorities’ optimal security allocation from all six models and 
compare these implications. I thus show how both terrorists’ target selection and the 
authorities’ optimal allocation depend on the assumptions about strategic behaviour. 
These models can thus be called interesting conceptual explorations.   
 
Models as instruments 
How can unrealistic models explain real-world phenomena? Instrumentalists argue 
that a model “should be judged only on its predictive power within the particular 
domain in which it is intended to be used” (Sugden, 2000: 11). Theories cannot be 
true or false and are thus not to be understood literally. Theories “are tools or 
calculating devices for organizing description of phenomena, and for drawing 
inferences from the past to future” (Hacking, 1983: 63). When a model is used 
instrumentally, it should generate empirical implications that are clearly distinct from 
its assumptions (Sugden, 2000: 12).  
All the formal models in this dissertation separate clearly between assumptions 
and implications. The assumptions are listed in the model descriptions and the 
implications are deduced from the equilibria. I deduce several implications from each 
of the models. Consequently, it is reasonable to maintain that the formal models are 
valuable in the instrumentalist sense if their implications survive empirical 
evaluation. Unfortunately, as mentioned in section 3, lack of appropriate data of high 
enough quality has made it impossible to test the models’ implications. The models 
are thus in principle valuable as instruments owing to producing implications that are 
falsifiable. This conclusion is, however, tentative since the implications have not 
survived an empirical evaluation. 
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Models as credible worlds  
Assuming that researchers aim at finding the truth about the world, it makes sense to 
ask whether the models are good descriptions of the world. But in what way may the 
models be good descriptions of the world? Gibbard and Varian emphasizes 
explanation rather than prediction. In their view, a model either explains an empirical 
phenomenon, or investigates the likely consequences of a real-world phenomenon. 
The model’s purpose is to communicate this explanation, or the likely consequences, 
to an audience (Sugden, 2000: 12–3). Gibbard and Varian furthermore suggest that 
models are caricatures. The model’s assumptions should thus be selected “not to 
approximate reality, but to exaggerate or isolate some feature of reality” (Gibbard & 
Varian, 1978: 676).  Mäki claims that economic scholars employ the method of 
isolation when formulating models: “a set of elements is theoretically removed from 
the influence of other elements in a given situation” (Mäki, 1992: 318). The effects 
that the theory wants to describe are isolated, and all other influences are sealed off. 
The method of theoretical isolation parallels the idea of experimental isolation. In 
experiments all other influences than the object of the study are sealed off. 
Theoretical isolations, or models, can thus be called thought experiments (Sugden, 
2000: 15).  
But how can thought experiments, which rely on restrictive assumptions, tell us 
something about the real world? Sugden (2000: 19) explains that the transition “from 
a particular hypothesis, which has been shown to be true in the model world, to a 
general hypothesis, which we can expect to be true in the real world too,” should be 
made through inductive inference. He then claims that for a model to be credible 
enough to justify inductive inference, the assumptions need to cohere with both each 
other and “with what is known about causal processes in the real world” (Sugden, 
2000: 26). The assumptions can be restrictive, but they must also seem adequately 
representative for the real world.  
Models I, III, V and VI in this dissertation does not seem realistic. Interviews with 
Norwegian authorities indicate that they do not act like a unitary rational actor when 
allocating security resources. These models are thus not credible worlds. Models II 
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and IV might, however, be more realistic; both assume that the terrorists attempt to 
maximize their subjective benefit of the attack without suffering too large subjective 
cost. Model II also assumes that the terrorists consider implemented security 
measures before choosing a target while model IV assumes that the terrorists ignore 
the security allocation. Depending on whether any of these assumptions seem 
credible, models II and IV might be considered reasonably good descriptions of the 
world. 
 
Models as fables  
Rubinstein (2006) presents an alternative, more austere, perspective on models. He 
claims that some formal models are unrealistic in the sense that they can lead to 
absurd conclusions, someone will nearly always be able to find an experiment to 
defeat the model and very few models can be used to provide serious advice. Models 
are furthermore not always necessary to find interesting regularities. He then claims 
that a good model resembles a good fable in the sense that, even if unrealistic, it 
draws a highly simplified parallel to a real-life situation, is free of extraneous details, 
and conveys some sound advice or relevant argument that can be used in the real 
world (Rubinstein, 2006: 881). Rubinstein states that “as in the case of a good fable, 
a good model can have an enormous influence on the real world, not by providing 
advice or by predicting the future, but rather by influencing … the way people think 
and behave” (Rubinstein, 2006: 881). 
Can this dissertation’s models be interpreted as fables? The models draw a parallel 
to a situation in real life: the processes of terrorists’ selection of targets and 
authorities’ allocation of security resources. All the models are furthermore free of 
extraneous details; they ignore, for instance, any deliberations before the players act. 
Finally, models I, III, V and VI convey advice (policy recommendations) to the 
authorities for use in the real world. Models II and IV also present relevant 
arguments for use in the real world; they explore how the terrorists might behave 
when the authorities ignore the terrorists’ behaviour.  
This dissertation’s models can thus also be interpreted as fables.   
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Summary 
The above discussion is summarized in table 1. 
Models 
as… 
Normative 
standards 
Conceptual 
explorations 
Instruments Credible 
worlds 
Fables 
Model I X 
X 
X  X 
Model II X X X X 
Model III X X  X 
Model IV  X X X 
Model V X X  X 
Model VI X X  X 
Table 2: The discussion summarized 
This section has explained how this dissertation’s models can inform us about the 
real world. Models I, II, III, IV, V and VI set a normative standard for behaviour: 
models I, III, V and VI explain how the authorities should act and models I, II and V 
show how terrorists should behave (given their goals). The anthology of models, 
furthermore, constitutes a conceptual exploration. In addition, all the models 
distinguish between assumptions and implications and can thus be described as 
(untested) instruments. Models II and IV might also be good descriptions of the 
world. Finally, all the models can be interpreted as fables. 
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Empirical analysis 
In paper 2 I compare implications deduced from the models with empirical data. The 
paper, however, suffer from a shortage of relevant data and I, thus, cannot perform 
any proper test of the implications/policy recommendations.   
To examine the behaviour of the multiple Norwegian transport authorities, I 
interviewed authorities responsible for protection of public transport targets. I 
conducted fourteen semi-structured interviews, seven in person and seven by phone. 
I selected organizations I consider representative for each of the transport modes 
(aviation, shipping, railway and public road transport). In aviation and railway I 
attempted to get an interview with 3–4 of the largest authorities in each mode that I 
believed were responsible for target protection. However, in shipping and public 
road transport, I had to make a selection of 4–5 authorities owing to the vast number 
of actors. Three interviewees declined: One scheduled interview with a company 
serving a ferry line in Norway and overseas was replaced by an interview with a 
similar ferry company. The other two interviewees who declined were unfortunately 
not replaceable. However, I interviewed authorities that regularly interact with these 
companies. These interviews indicated that other authorities than the missed 
companies in the transport mode were primarily responsible for target protection. 
Consequently, I have assumed in my analysis that the missed authorities do not 
spend anything on target protection measures. Even if this assumption may not be 
strictly true, I believe the actual spending is so small that the error is very small at 
worst. 
Of course, deciding whether the actual allocation is optimal is impossible without 
looking at the actual allocation. When I interviewed the Norwegian authorities 
responsible for the protection of public transport targets, I also collected information 
about the amount of security resources9 allocated to target protection10
                                                 
9 The allocation is measured in Norwegian kroner. 
. I have tried 
to establish for what purpose these resources were allocated. I have included all the 
10 The amount of security resources allocated to target protection may not reflect the overall security level. 
The security level also depends on security culture and security procedures that do not generate extra 
spending.  
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time spent on risk analysis, planning, knowledge transference and rehearsing for 
security; I have collected information about the number of man-labour years used 
and calculated the expenditures, assuming that the cost of a man-labour year is 1.2 
million Norwegian kroner. In some cases, the only spending on security actually was 
the time spent every five years or so on planning for a terrorist event. In these 
situations I calculated the amount of time spent on planning each time and divided it 
on the number of years the plan should last. Some security spending has been 
excluded; the expenditures on guarding have not been included when measuring the 
amount of security resources allocated to railway stations and bus terminals. The 
large number of security guards on some of the largest nodes is caused by the high 
amount of crime and misconduct, and the same number of guards would likely have 
been employed even without any threat whatsoever from mass-casualty attacks. 
Decomposing the expenses into allocations to specific targets, for example to 
specific railway stations, proved too difficult. I have therefore collected information 
about expenditures from representative authorities in each transport mode. 
Consequently, the data do not reflect the differences in security expenditures within 
each transport mode (aggregation problem). Furthermore, if the authorities 
interviewed are less representative than I assumed, the data may be biased.  
Owing to the small number of cases and the abovementioned aggregation 
problem, paper 2 cannot offer any proper test of the models’ implications. The 
interviews do, however, show that it is unlikely that the authorities allocate security 
resources optimally in the sense that they minimize the number of casualties and the 
transport disruption.     
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The relationship between the papers 
All the papers in this dissertation share a primary purpose: advising the authorities 
about protecting targets against terrorist attacks (even if indirectly through 
designers). They furthermore build on the same research strategy, applying formal 
models to deduce concrete implications which can be, and to some extent are, 
confronted with empirical data. This strategy is very explicit in papers 1 and 2, while 
more implicit in papers 3 and 4; paper 3 builds on model I in papers 1 and 2 while 
paper 4 builds on the reasoning from paper 3.   
The papers differ in at least three respects. First, paper 1 focuses on terrorists’ 
behaviour; all implications predict how terrorists behave under different 
assumptions. In contrast, papers 2 and 3 focus on the authorities, by deducing policy 
recommendations for prioritization between targets and measures when protecting 
targets against terrorist attacks. Paper 4, furthermore, focuses on how the designer 
should deal with the specific practical design problem of securing railway carriages 
against explosive terrorist attacks. 
Second, the papers differ concerning which parameters are treated as exogenous 
and thus constant. Papers 1 and 2 assume that the authorities can only influence the 
probability of an attack’s being successful. Papers 3 and 4, in contrast, assume that 
the authorities can also influence the impact of a successful attack and the terrorists’ 
cost of attacking.  
Finally, the papers differ in their technical level. The theoretical parts of papers 1 
and 2 are very formal in structure and a relatively high level of technical skill is 
required to understand all parts. In contrast, the theoretical parts of papers 3 and 4 are 
more accessible.  
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Paper summaries  
The first paper explores terrorists’ choice of target when attacking. Some scholars 
argue that if one site is secured, terrorists will simply attack a different site (target 
substitution). Other scholars claim that terrorists do not care whether their attack 
succeeds; they focus on committing the act. Assuming that terrorists seek some sort 
of immediate effect from attacking, this paper derives empirically testable 
implications from four different formal models. Investigating the correlation between 
the authorities’ security allocation and the terrorists’ target selection enables us to 
distinguish between strategic and non-strategic authorities and terrorists. Strategic 
authorities implement security measures to minimize damage from terror attacks, 
taking into account how these measures affect the terrorists’ target selection and their 
investment in an attack, while non-strategic authorities allocate security resources 
based on other factors than expected utility. Strategic terrorists select targets and 
attack investment to maximize effect, taking into account implemented security 
measures, whereas non-strategic terrorists ignore implemented security measures.  
I demonstrate that if terrorists cannot be deterred from attacking, strategic 
authorities will ensure that the terrorists attack well-protected targets. Protection is 
desirable not only when it deters the terrorists from attacking, but also when it causes 
the terrorists to target sites that are less rather than more damaging for the 
authorities.  
The second paper explores the optimal allocation of protective security resources 
between targets given different assumptions about terrorists’ target selection. The 
paper defines the optimal allocation as the allocation that minimizes expected 
casualties. Few scholarly contributions on allocation of security resources offer 
concrete policy recommendations. I contribute towards closing this gap by (1) 
translating theoretical notions of optimal security allocations into concrete policy 
recommendations and (2) comparing these recommendations with actual Norwegian 
security allocations in transport. I argue that, when protecting against terrorist 
attacks, priority should be given to potential targets that display a high expected 
number of casualties, many foreign travellers, low employee density, many hiding 
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places, many access points, high passenger anonymity, high share of earlier attacks 
and high system fragility. Interviews with Norwegian transport authorities suggest 
that international commitments and each authority’s budget constraints, rather than 
concerns for efficiency at the aggregate (national) level, determine the authorities’ 
allocation of security resources. 
The third paper assumes that a main goal of the authorities is to minimize human 
casualties and injuries. It explores which measures should be prioritized when 
protecting a railway network against explosive attacks. The literature on protective 
security measures against terrorism focuses mainly on suggesting measures for 
protecting targets rather than on prioritizing between measures. This paper attempts 
to bridge this gap by combining game theory with lessons from situational crime 
prevention theory, crime scripts and crime prevention through environmental design 
to prioritize between protective security measures against explosive attacks on 
railways. The discussion shows that measures that focus on limiting damage caused 
by the explosive attack rather than measures that reduce the probability of the 
attack’s being successful are the best protective security measures. This paper argues 
that the best protective security measures have a huge effect on the expected harm of 
explosive attacks compared to cost in currency and operability.  
Anyone trying to devise counter-terrorist designs for railway carriages faces a 
range of issues. In particular, designers need a framework for thinking about 
security. The fourth paper (co-authored with Paul Ekblom) explores the specific 
practical design problem of securing railway carriages against explosive terrorist 
attacks and assesses the benefits of articulating such exploration through the use of 
the Security Function Framework (SFF). We present the SFF framework, apply it to 
the ExRes carriage and evaluate it according to defined criteria. Our evaluation 
shows that the SFF framework is clearly expressed, aids the designer in 
communicating design requirements, facilitates systematic creativity without 
necessarily generating completely new ideas, and appears practically applicable. 
However, we emphasize that ours have been ‘bench tests’; such tests are really no 
substitute for trying the SFF out with real life designers. 
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Major findings and final remarks  
Recent high-profile terrorist events, including the September 11 attack, have led to 
an enormous increase in the allocation of security resources in the Western World, 
particularly in public transport. The amount of resources we can spend on security is, 
however, limited. When spending more on security, the authorities must reduce other 
expenditures correspondingly, for instance, spending on traffic safety, schools or 
health services. Security resources are thus limited and should be prioritized so as to 
make the most of them. Practitioners with limited security resources lack appropriate 
guidelines when protecting targets against mass-casualty attacks. Existing guidelines 
about prioritization between targets and protective security measures are either very 
abstract or consist of roughly collected advice. Combining game theory with 
practically oriented literature, such as situational crime prevention, crime scripts and 
crime prevention through environmental design, this dissertation establishes a 
systematic framework for prioritizing between targets and measures and provides 
concrete policy recommendations (given certain assumptions about motivation). I 
argue that:   
1. If terrorists cannot be deterred from attacking, strategic authorities will 
ensure that the terrorists attack well-protected targets. Protection is desirable 
not only when it deters the terrorists from attacking, but also when it causes 
the terrorists to target sites that are less rather than more damaging for the 
authorities. 
2. When protecting against mass-casualty attacks, the authorities should give 
priority to potential targets with a high expected number of casualties, many 
foreigners, low employee density, many hiding places, many access points, 
high anonymity, high share of earlier attacks, and high system fragility.  
3. When protecting against explosive attacks on railway networks, the best 
protective security measures focus on limiting the damage caused by an 
explosive attack, rather than on reducing the probability of an attack’s being 
successful.  
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4. By thinking counter-terrorism when designing railway carriages, we may 
significantly reduce the expected damage caused by explosive attacks on 
railway. 
These policy recommendations should ideally have been tested. Testing is, 
however, very difficult owing to both lack of appropriate data and costs of 
experiments. Datasets that are large or detailed enough to do proper quantitative or 
qualitative testing are wanting, and even experiments that only test one specific 
measure can be extremely expensive to carry out, e.g. blowing up structures to 
investigate what strengthens structural redundancy. Testing the recommendations are 
thus outside this dissertation’s scope. Further research should nevertheless aim at 
evaluating the recommendations when feasible. 
Since testing the policy recommendations are outside this dissertation’s scope, 
evaluation of the policy recommendations must assess how they have been derived. 
This dissertation has formulated several formal models, deduced implications and, by 
including additional assumptions, translated these implications into policy 
recommendations. The additional assumptions include: (1) the existence of many 
hiding places increases the likelihood of an unwanted item being left undisturbed 
(see paper 2), (2) increased standoff will usually lead to fewer injuries of an 
explosive attack (see paper 3), and (3) a reduced number of forgotten items will 
facilitate the discovery of actual left explosives (see paper 4). Since the policy 
recommendations rely on these assumptions, I have tried to substantiate them when 
relevant in the papers.  
The formal models I deduce implications from are not observable as such and thus 
not testable. They rest, however, on their assumptions, assumptions which I discuss 
in the remainder of this section.  
This dissertation assumes that the authorities’ main aim is to minimize casualties 
and serious injuries. If the authorities primarily seek something else, the 
recommendations will probably not apply. If, for instance, the authorities basically 
seek to increase passengers’ sense of safety, rather than their real safety, measures 
that make the public feel safe will be better than the measures advocated by this 
dissertation’s policy recommendations. Hence, this dissertation’s policy 
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recommendations are only valid if the authorities primarily want to minimize 
casualties and serious injuries. 
Parts of this dissertation (see especially policy recommendations A and B in paper 
2) assume that the terrorists primarily seek to cause mass-killings. I do not assume 
that causing mass-killings is their only goal, nor their long-term goal, only their 
primary short-term goal. I, furthermore, do not claim that all terrorists seek 
indiscriminate mass-killings; most terrorist attacks seemingly have other main 
purposes, such as assassinations and most hostage situations. Statements made by 
jihadist ideologues and jihadist attackers, however, support the notion that some of 
these attackers deliberately seek indiscriminate mass-killings. The scope of this 
dissertation is to formulate policy recommendations that aid authorities in 
minimizing mass-killings from these attacks.   
This dissertation furthermore assumes that the terrorists, at the time of their 
decision, possess knowledge about (1) all possible targets and modi operandi, (2) the 
probability of an attack’s being successful (if not especially noted that they lack such 
knowledge), (3) the benefit from a successful attack and (4) their cost of attacking. 
This knowledge requires both a prior knowledge base and the ability to collect 
additional information, each which entails analytical abilities, resources (internet, 
car, etc) and time, any of which they might lack. Some security measures are, 
furthermore, easy to detect while others might be nearly impossible to discover 
before actually attacking. For measures that are neither completely public nor 
completely hidden, there will probably be a time lag between when it is introduced 
and when the terrorists discover its existence. Reconnaissance before attacking 
without being detected has also become more difficult lately owing to increased 
surveillance and larger general awareness about the risk of terrorist attacks. 
Consequently, the information available to attackers before choosing a target and a 
modus operandi is limited. The attackers might thus suffer from bounded rationality 
and as a result copy other successful attacks rather than weigh the costs and benefits 
of each attack. Such a copy cat strategy would make this dissertation’s policy 
recommendations less valid. 
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 The copy cat strategy, however, actually makes the authorities’ job of minimizing 
mass-killings easier; if the authorities study what other attackers have done 
successfully (or nearly successfully) and find measures that would have stopped or 
limited the damage from such attacks, the authorities can implement these measures 
provided they have the necessary resources available. Furthermore, the authorities 
can avoid spending security resources on targets that potential attackers lack 
knowledge about. 
Terrorist recruits come from different backgrounds and thus have different prior 
experience. Such differences might cause divergences in the expected utility of 
attacking; if a recruited terrorist has some specific knowledge that can be employed 
when attacking a specific target and/or using a specific modus operandi, it might be 
optimal for that terrorist to choose that target and/or that modus operandi (because it 
increases the probability of the attack’s being successful). The formal models in this 
dissertation depict the terrorist only as a seeker of some effect; they ignore how the 
probability of success might depend on the terrorist’s prior experience. The very 
generic depiction of the terrorist makes the policy recommendations less concrete. 
This problem can unfortunately not be mended without more knowledge about who 
is recruited and what sort of background they have. 
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Specifying the explosion-resistant railway carriage - a desktop test of 
the Security Function Framework1
 
   
Abstract 
Anyone trying to devise counter-terrorist designs for railway carriages faces a range of 
issues. In particular, designers need a framework for thinking about security. This paper 
explores the specific practical design problem of securing railway carriages against 
explosive terrorist attacks and assesses the benefits of articulating such exploration through 
the use of the Security Function Framework (SFF). We present the SFF framework, apply it 
to the ExRes carriage and evaluate it according to defined criteria. Our evaluation shows 
that the SFF framework is clearly expressed, aids the designer in communicating design 
requirements, facilitates systematic creativity without necessarily generating completely 
new ideas, and appears practically applicable. However, we emphasize that ours have been 
‘bench tests’; such tests are really no substitute for trying the SFF out with real life 
designers. 
 
Key words: Security, Design against Crime, Offender Scripts, Counter-terrorism, 
Transport, Improvised Explosive Devices. 
 
  
                                                 
1 Sunniva Meyer thanks Institute of Transport Economics and the Research Council of Norway for funding her 
contribution to this study. 
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1. Introduction 
Railway sites are attractive targets for terrorists: they are both crowded and easily 
accessible, and offer the prospect of highly-disruptive and high-profile outcomes. 
Several of the deadliest attacks in European history have actually targeted passenger 
traffic on railways (Lia and Nesser 2005: 37–38). Attack methods range from 
derailing (e.g. the attempted derailing of the high-speed railway between Madrid and 
Seville in 2004) to poison gas (Japan) to suicide bombing (London). Explosive 
attacks are particularly attractive; they can damage structures and bring down 
buildings, as well as kill people. Furthermore, media coverage of bombings is 
considerably more graphic than coverage of, say, a shooting (Clarke and Newman 
2006: 109). This paper thus focuses on attacks using explosives, whether carried onto 
the train by pedestrians or vehicle-borne at the trackside, and whether suicidal or not.  
Terrorism has diverse causes at many levels (Roach et al. 2005), and 
correspondingly many kinds of intervention exist. Situational crime prevention (e.g. 
Clarke and Newman (2006)) works through increasing the (real and perceived) risk 
and effort of committing terrorist acts, and reducing the reward, by changing the 
targets and environments of terrorism and influencing the behaviour of preventive 
agents such as guardians and place managers. One sector which can contribute to 
situational prevention is the industrial design, construction and manufacture of places 
and products. A specific domain within this sector is the design and construction of 
railway carriages. The first purpose of this paper is to explore the specific practical 
problem of designing explosion-resistant railway carriages. 
Anyone trying to devise counter-terrorist designs for railway carriages faces a 
range of issues. For example, the designs must be effective, and they must minimally 
interfere with everyday running of the railway or passenger safety, comfort and 
convenience. The designs must also be implementable, whether in terms of 
practical/technological constraints on manufacture, or in terms of appeal and 
feasibility to the diverse decision-makers. In the complex, privatised world of 
railways (Design Council 2000) responsibility is divided (in the UK for example) 
between train operating companies, rolling stock hire companies (who own the 
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carriages and rent them to operators), carriage designers and builders, and the track 
provider (National Rail). 
In this context it is easy for designers to become confused. To help designers build 
their capacity to innovate and communicate, a language and framework of security is 
needed. Such a framework should articulate the requirements of security, integrating 
these requirements with all the other aspects of design2
What requirements should a security framework fulfil? Drawing on Cropley’s 
(2010)) functional treatment of creativity, it should support the generation of designs 
that are effective and relevant, novel and surprising, elegant and generalisable. It 
should be deliberative in fostering close and careful attention to detail. It should also 
be systematic and rigorous, supportive of use of research evidence and theory. It 
should be practical in leading from theory and research to the design of real working 
products, places and systems.  
. The second purpose of this 
paper is thus to assess the benefits of a particular language and framework, the 
Security Function Framework (SFF), which has been developed in a very different 
context, covering the design of secure bike parking facilities (Thorpe et al. 2009) and 
of anti-theft clips to secure customers’ bags to tables in bars (Ekblom 2012 a,b).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes how the value-
added contribution of a security framework might be assessed. Section 3 introduces 
the SFF. Section 4 applies the SFF to explosion-resistant carriages, leading to an 
analysis of the problem and a design specification for solutions. Section 5 assesses 
the SFF as a means of generating good design specifications with regard to its 
application and, finally, section 6 summarizes this paper. 
 
                                                 
2 Most of these will be ordinary, everyday needs such as safety, economy and convenience. In a peacetime 
society where armoured trains are historical or cinematic freaks, civil needs should predominate – we should 
avoid ‘vulnerability-led’ designs (Durodié 2002) and ‘paranoid products’ (Gamman and Thorpe 2007). To do 
otherwise would be to concede a victory to the terrorists. 
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2. Assessment criteria 
As stated in the introduction, assessment can cover both the ExRes design 
specification we have produced, and the performance of the SFF in generating that 
specification. In both cases an ideal approach, would include trying out the 
specification and the framework on real designers (neither of us are practising 
industrial designers, although one of us regularly works with them), and preferably 
those designers from the rail industry. But for reasons now to become apparent, these 
aspirations are some way down the line. 
 
Assessing the ExRes Carriage 
How might we evaluate the ExRes Carriage specification?  Obviously we cannot yet 
assess the quality and the performance of any real-world prototypes or production 
models that the specification has engendered, or even the range and variety of 
possibilities generated, since none has yet been constructed. Nor, for the same 
reason, can we assess the final technical design realisation as it might appear in 
Computer-Aided Design (for example using ‘walk-through, think terrorist’ exercises 
based on a virtual reality simulation of a carriage interior; or a computerised 
simulation of blast effects). 
At the very least we can, as designers say, ‘correlate’ the final specification in 
terms of the original purpose-level requirement, with the suggestions for intervention 
mechanisms and methods that we have suggested: do the suggestions reflect the 
purpose? We can also correlate the specification with the theory and evidence of 
situational prevention, to see how plausible the elements of that specification are. We 
can also offer the specification for criticism to those (such as transport police) 
responsible for rail security or counter-terrorism and (one hopes) possessed of a 
wealth of practical experience, as described in the ‘critique’ stage of the Design 
Against Crime methodology.3
                                                 
3 
  In this way the rationale of the design can be 
subjected to scrutiny, if not strictly put to the test. 
www.designagainstcrime.com/?page_id=23  
139 
 
 
Assessing SFF 
We’re perhaps in a better position to assess the performance of SFF in helping to 
generate and communicate design specifications in a domain (counter-terrorist 
design in a large-scale product and extremely large-scale system), far from its origins 
in addressing everyday crimes through small-scale interventions, although here we 
have only a single case study, and again this is a self-assessment. Criteria for this 
assessment are that the SFF framework should be: 
 clearly expressed, 
 fertile, and  
 practically applicable. 
We offer some answers in section 5, drawing particularly on the experience of one of 
us who was a newcomer to SFF. Further answers cannot be given until we have a 
suite of case studies of specification generations, leading to actual design realisations 
and drawing on the experience of designers. 
 
3. The Security Function Framework 
Here we introduce a four-level framework, under development by Ekblom and 
colleagues (e.g. Ekblom 2009; Ekblom 2010; Ekblom 2012a, b) for describing a 
product’s ‘security function’. ‘Security function’ is taken to mean: 
 
The properties of a product which, interacting through causal mechanisms 
with entities, agents and systems within its environment, serve the purpose of 
reducing the risk of crime and increasing security and community safety. The 
properties in question may be deliberately conferred, amplified or directed 
through the design, materials and construction of the product and/or its 
environment. Risk is taken to include possibility of particular kinds of adverse 
events occurring, their probability and the harm they may cause. 
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The four-level framework consists of: 
1. The product’s purpose; 
2. The product’s security niche; 
3. The product’s mechanisms; 
4. The technical description of the product. 
Describing purpose covers several distinct aspects.  
(I) What is the designed product for? This is its principal purpose. But this isn’t 
the end of the story. 
(II) What, if any, subsidiary purpose/s does it have? When the principal purpose 
doesn’t relate to security, the security purpose may be a subsidiary one. We 
could take this further by considering each aspect of risk separately (is the 
purpose to eliminate the possibility of certain kinds of criminal event? 
Reduce the probability? Reduce the harm?). We should also specify where 
the product is intended to be used. 
(III) What other desire requirements must it meet, that are beneficial to the 
immediate users and manufacturers; expressed alternatively, what other 
drivers must it satisfy?  
(IV) Finally, what ‘hygiene’ or social responsibility requirements must it meet, 
referring to other societal values which the product should not interfere 
with, or should positively boost?  
In generic terms, the designer’s major task in preventing crime is to identify and 
resolve the contradictions in the design requirement, whether these contradictions are 
strategic ones relating to fundamentals of the crime problem (keep passengers and 
property safe whilst maintaining an efficient, attractive and economic rail service), or 
tactical ones which may relate to ‘troublesome tradeoffs (Ekblom 2005) with other 
drivers/values (such as energy efficiency or social inclusion) or within crime 
prevention itself.  Contradictions apart, the designer must also seek to exploit 
complementary or synergistic functions.  
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The concept of security niche attempts to characterise how the security function 
within a given product relates to other products, people and places in the human 
ecosystem.  
Consider some product, such as a handbag or laptop carrier, which is at risk of 
being a target of, or a tool for, crime. Security can be conferred in several ways, 
singly or in combination (cf Ekblom 2005): 
 The bag could be safe – not in itself needing explicit security because it is 
used only in secure environments, protected by enclosures and/or people 
acting as crime preventers such as guardians or place managers (Clarke and 
Eck 2003). In practice complete safety occurs only in relatively rare 
circumstances.   
 A bag that was in fact exposed to significant risk could be protected by 
separate security products or securing products.  A security product’s 
principal purpose is protecting some other target, person or property against 
crime – an example could be an audible alarm lanyard that is triggered if the 
bag is snatched.  Securing products by contrast have a subsidiary security 
purpose additional to their principal purpose (for example the Stop Thief chair 
www.stopthiefchair.com/  is primarily for sitting on but a pair of notches cut 
in the front of the seat enables a bag to be securely hitched beneath the 
owner’s knees, in a café or pub).   
 Deploying the above approaches makes for a secured product, protected by 
external means. But the product itself could be designed to be a secure one, 
that protects itself:  
o by the incorporation of security or securing components. These 
components may either be retrofitted, or factory-fitted, where product 
and component are designed or selected to fit one another well, such as 
the tamper-evident lid on food containers. In the case of the bag, an 
RFID chip could be inserted to protect against shoplifting; since this 
chip could also help with stock control and supply chain monitoring, 
the RFID would be a securing product. 
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o by deliberate security adaptations (Ekblom and Sidebottom 2007) to its 
inherent causal properties, realised through constructional features 
and/or materials. These adaptations either work by themselves (such as 
anti-slash wire mesh incorporated within the fabric), or in conjunction 
with human action such as guardianship (for example where the 
opening flap of a handbag is fastened by Velcro, which alerts the 
owner by movement and noise when it is opened).  Both these features 
and more are incorporated within the Karrysafe range designed by 
Adam Thorpe (www.inthebag.org.uk/?page_id=479).  
The same product can occupy multiple niches and have several ecological 
relationships. In security terms this is captured in a distinction noted in Ekblom 
(2009) between a product as object of crime – an asset – and the same product in-
function.  Our bag can be stolen for its own value, as well as for the contents it 
contains and perhaps protects (as a securing product itself) valuables or fails to 
protect.  
Purpose must ultimately link to more practical aspects of design. But it is best not 
to leap straight from high-level purpose to a technical specification as described 
below. Rather, smarter understanding (and more efficient knowledge transfer to other 
design tasks) requires an intermediate consideration of the causal mechanisms – how 
the design intervention works by interrupting, diverting or weakening those causes. 
Usually it is possible to identify several parallel mechanisms which may underlie a 
preventive effect (for example, physical blocking of crime, in parallel to subjective 
discouragement of offenders from anticipated effort). An understanding of 
immediate causal mechanisms of crime and its prevention is the royal road to 
analysing risk and reducing this risk through design. More generally, it is 
fundamental to replicating the core principles of successful crime prevention in ways 
that are intelligently and perhaps innovatively customised to new contexts (Pawson 
and Tilley 1997; Ekblom 2005).  
Given that offenders can be seen as both ‘caused’ and as active, goal-directed, 
planning and decision-making agents (Ekblom 2007; Ekblom 2011), or ‘caused 
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agents’ for short, a useful parallel perspective to straight causal mechanisms is that of 
scripts (Cornish 1994)( Freilich and Chermak 2009), supplemented by knowledge of 
offenders’ perpetrator techniques (or modus operandi) and their resources  (Ekblom 
and Tilley 2000; Gill 2005). For example, the offender has to seek a crime target (say  
a handbag), see and select the target, approach without arousing suspicion, steal the 
bag and escape preferably un-noticed, before converting and/or enjoying the value of 
the loot and perhaps covering tracks. Ekblom (2012b) extends this in design terms to 
the concept of script clashes – where the offender’s script engages with the user or 
preventer’s script in such issues as surveillance versus concealment, challenge versus 
excuse, pursuit versus escape. These clashes are, as it were, the pivots on which 
designers and other professional crime preventers have to tip the design of products, 
environments and procedures in favour of the good party. As offenders and 
preventers get to know and anticipate one another’s’ scripts and the mutual script 
clashes, the scripts may co-evolve towards greater elaboration of countermove and 
counter-countermove. 
Technical descriptions state how the causal properties of the product, properties 
which contribute to the mechanisms of prevention described above, are realised 
through construction, manufacture and operation. Construction is about materials 
and distinguishable structural features of the design. Manufacture is about how it is 
made. Operation is about how it acts in tangible terms with human action (or 
conceivably, under control of artificial intelligence) such as keys turned, cards 
swiped or actuators releasing locks.  
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Four-level description – overview 
In sum, an abbreviated four-level description of a security function could say 
something like this, using the Stop Thief chair as example:  
1 (purpose) The Stop Thief chair is designed with principal purpose to serve 
as a fully functional and appropriately-styled chair, and subsidiary purpose – 
without in any way jeopardising the principal purpose – to reduce the risk of 
theft of customers’ bags in places like bars and restaurants.  2 (security 
niche) It is thus a securing product. 3 (mechanism) It works by supplying 
physical anchorage of the target bag, that is differentially easier to release by 
the bag-owner; by mobilising usage of the security function of the chair, and 
the surveillance and reaction that it favours by the user/owner and others 
acting as preventers; and by deterrence through increasing the offender’s 
perception of risk of being detected and caught in the act. All these 
mechanisms are supported 4 (technically) by the incorporation of a twin 
notch feature cut or moulded in the leading edge of the seat part of the chair, 
over which the bag handle is placed by the user/owner, the bag then being 
anchored due to its handle being enclosed between the seat and the back of the 
user/owner’s knees. 
 
The complete description of the design of secure or securing products in particular 
must of course go well beyond security and crime considerations. How the design 
satisfies other purposes and requirements, perhaps resolving troublesome tradeoffs 
between security and desire factors such as convenience, safety, economy and style, 
are all key to the wider design process. If all these requirements are inadequately 
addressed, then there is little point in getting the crime prevention requirement right 
because nobody will buy the chair! Similarly, if the consequences of poor security 
design are that fewer people buy the chair, then sales will be lower and that will have 
commercial repercussions; but experience has suggested that good design can give 
this concept a Unique Selling Proposition. 
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4. The ExRes carriage 
Having developed the SFF in the context of everyday crimes and modest design 
interventions, how does it fare when handling design against extreme and rare crimes 
against which radical interventions have been contemplated and sometimes 
implemented?  This section tests out the Security Function Framework just 
introduced, to describe a suggested specification for an explosion-resistant railway 
carriage; the ExRes carriage. 
 
The ExRes carriage’s purpose 
The principal purpose of the ExRes carriage is, obviously enough, to transport the 
passengers from one station to another. 
The subsidiary, security, purpose is to protect passengers against injuries from 
explosive attacks by (1) decreasing the probability of anyone committing an 
explosive attack (primary security4); (2) decreasing the probability of an attack’s 
being successful (primary security); and (3) decreasing the harm, intended or 
otherwise, inflicted by an explosive attack (secondary security5). It helps at this point 
to switch to the perspective of the offender. Assuming that the offender wants to 
maximize the expected harm6 of an explosive attack while minimizing the cost of 
attacking, the probability of a possible offender committing an explosive attack 
depends on the offender’s perceptions of the probability of an attack’s being 
successful, the harm inflicted by an explosive attack and the cost of attacking7,8
                                                 
4 Primary security includes actions that eliminate possibility of criminal event (e.g. using system design to 
replace the annual payment of vehicle tax, which many drivers manage to evade, by increased fuel tax, which 
they cannot); or if this cannot be done, actions reduce its probability (e.g. making it harder to break into cars). 
. 
5 Secondary security – if event does happen, action limits harm to all parties and property as it unfolds (e.g. 
stopping the ongoing damage and continued loss of revenue from a vandalised vending machine by rapidly 
alerting the repair team). 
6 What sort of harm he or she wants to maximize depends on the motivation behind the attack. 
7 See Meyer (2011) for a more elaborate explanation. 
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The ExRes Carriage must furthermore have some other desire qualities. The 
passenger wants it to be aesthetic, comfortable, safe and easy to enter/exit. The 
railway operator wants it to be economical to purchase, service and operate, safe, 
aesthetic, easy to clean, durable, easy to operate, spacious and appealing to 
passengers (including feeling safe). The manufacturer wants it to be relatively 
inexpensive to produce, suitable for a wide range of railway systems and safe for 
passengers (at least to the extent that the manufacturer might be liable should an 
event happen; more generously speaking, motivated by broader ethical 
considerations). 
In addition, the ExRes carriage should meet some ‘hygiene’ or social 
responsibility requirements: it should be environmentally sustainable, energy 
effective, inclusive etc. As with cars, there is also a major concern with fail-safe and 
safety in crashes, some of which may synergise or conflict with anti-explosion 
requirements. 
 
The ExRes carriage’s security niche 
The ExRes carriage is a securing product: it has a principal purpose of safely and 
comfortably transporting passengers plus a subsidiary security purpose of protecting 
passengers against injury from explosive attacks whilst on board or adjacent to the 
carriage (for example on the platform or in another passing train).  
As valued assets in themselves, ordinary railway carriages additionally need 
security against the possibility that they, and not just the people they contain, are the 
target of crime (such as vandalism or theft of fittings) or terrorism. This reflects the 
distinction noted in section 4 between a product as object of crime and product in-
function. Altogether, then, carriages could take the following niches (examples are 
illustrative more than necessarily practical): 
                                                                                                                                                     
8 When increasing the probability that an offender will be caught, the measure increases tertiary security – 
action limits propagation of harm that may occur post-event, as well as primary security. 
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(1) Safe if sited in a secure environment where all personnel and passengers 
with belongings were screened for explosives before entering the railway 
carriage and both sidings and running tracks enclosed by physical barriers 
with access control and/or guarded. Planting of dense spiny bushes like 
blackthorn (Prunus spinosa) alongside the track could hinder access to both 
pedestrian and Vehicle Borne explosives whilst improving aesthetics 
(these bushes would be securing ‘products’). Anything approaching 
complete safety is of course unlikely but a certain minimally secure 
environment is needed if constructing and operating a railway is to be a 
feasible proposition9
(2) Secured if protected by 
.  
 separate security products, dedicated to minimizing harm from 
explosive attacks against the carriages – for example, a sniffer for 
detecting explosives that the train guard carries while inspecting 
tickets. 
 separate securing products, minimizing harm from explosive attacks 
against the railway carriage as a sideline. – for example, the practice 
of having season or multi-use tickets carrying personal 
identification, principally for revenue protection, could increase the 
risks to the offender.  
(3) Secure if protected by  
 security or securing components, for example if a warning system 
for suspicious behaviour or vapours were installed in the railway 
carriages. 
 deliberate security adaptations, for example if carriage walls were 
made of blast-absorbing materials.  
                                                 
9 As with so-called ‘pacification’ of Native Americans in the 19th-Century West or theft of copper signal 
cabling in the UK today (Sidebottom et al. in press). 
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The securing function of the carriage, protecting the passengers it conveys, is 
conferred by (2) and (3) above. 
 
Mechanisms 
To design a railway carriage that protects passengers against injuries from explosive 
attacks we must understand the immediate causal mechanisms that allow those 
attacks to take place; and thus how these causal mechanisms can be interrupted such 
that the passengers’ injuries are avoided or minimized in case of an explosive attack. 
As mentioned earlier, injuries can be minimized by (1) reducing the probability of 
anyone attempting an explosive attack; (2) reducing the probability of an attack’s 
being successful; and (3) reducing the harm inflicted by an explosive attack. The 
probability of a possible offender attempting an explosive attack depends on the 
offenders’ perceptions of the probability of an attack’s being successful, the harm 
inflicted by an explosive attack and the cost of attacking given that the offender 
wants to maximize harm and minimize the cost of attacking.   
Visualising dynamic mechanisms requires considering scripts and perpetrator 
techniques. When targeting a railway carriage, an explosive device can be delivered 
either by backpack/suitcase/shopping bag (person borne), or by car/truck (vehicle 
borne). A person borne explosive can be left to detonate, inside a carriage by a 
passenger/employee or on the rail track, or detonated while carried, i.e. suicide attack 
(Meyer 2011). Some abbreviated examples follow. A crime script10
1. Enter station without being detected or challenged. 
 for an offender 
when leaving a device inside a railway carriage could go something like this: 
2. Wait for suitable railway carriage while keeping the explosives safe from 
weather or accidental premature detonation. 
3. Enter railway carriage while keeping the explosives safe from weather or 
accidental premature detonation. 
                                                 
10 All crime scripts in this function statement obviously assume that necessary reconnaissance, explosive and 
tool purchases and device assembling already have been accomplished. 
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4. Search for suitable hiding place while keeping the explosives safe from 
weather or accidental premature detonation and without being spotted or 
challenged. 
5. Leave container with explosive at hiding place without being spotted or 
challenged. 
6. Exit carriage without being challenged. 
7. Leave station without being challenged. 
8. Detonate explosive if it is remote controlled (and without automatic timer) 
without being spotted and frustrated, or (for bombers who wish to survive) 
getting injured from the explosion. 
A crime script for an offender when leaving an explosive on the railway track could 
be: 
1. Search for unguarded entrance to tracks, or create one by cutting fence. 
2. Enter tracks through unguarded entrance without being spotted or challenged. 
3. Search for suitable spot to leave explosive without being run down by train. 
4. Leave explosive at suitable spot without being spotted. 
5. Exit tracks through unguarded entrance without being spotted or challenged. 
6. Leave site before railway carriage hits the explosive(s) without being spotted. 
A crime script for a person borne suicide attack could be: 
1. Enter station without being spotted or challenged. 
2. Wait for suitable railway carriage while keeping the explosives safe from 
weather or accidental premature detonation. 
3. Enter railway carriage while keeping explosives safe from weather or 
accidental premature detonation. 
4. Sit down or stand in carriage while keeping explosives safe from accidental 
premature detonation. 
5. Wait for suitable moment in terms of crowded carriage, location in tunnel or 
high-visibility place (e.g. on a bridge) and detonate explosives. 
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A person borne explosive is limited by the weight an individual can carry, while a 
vehicle borne explosive can obviously be much larger. A vehicle can be parked along 
the track or crashed into the carriage. The crime script for an offender parking a 
vehicle along or, if possible, on the track might be: 
1. Find suitable spot for the explosive(s) and for nearby viewing point for 
detonation without being spotted or challenged. 
2. Remove any physical obstacles at detonation site without being spotted or 
challenged. 
3. Arm device and leave vehicle without being spotted or challenged. 
4. Leave area and/or go to viewing point. 
5. Detonate device if remote controlled without being spotted or getting injured 
from explosion.  
The crime script for an offender crashing into a railway carriage with a vehicle borne 
explosive could be: 
1. Find suitable spot for crashing vehicle into carriage without being spotted or 
challenged. 
2. Remove any physical obstacles without being spotted or challenged. 
3.  Arm device and await train without being spotted or challenged. 
4. Crash into carriage while detonating the explosives.  
The passenger script is: 
1. Enter station. 
2. Wait for train while keeping comfortable. 
3. Enter railway carriage. 
4. Sit down or find place to stand. 
5. Wait for right station, with or without entertainment, or other mental 
strategies for occupying time and/or shutting out what may be noisy, crowded 
surroundings.  
6. Exit railway carriage. 
7. Exit station. 
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The employee script would vary with work tasks, but may include looking out for 
suspicious behaviour and left-behind items. 
Script clashes here include 
 surveillance by employees versus offender hiding explosives in carriage or on 
track 
 surveillance by passengers versus offender hiding explosives in carriage 
 driver stopping train if spotting vehicle or explosive device on the track 
Applying the above scripts, the following mechanisms for minimizing passenger 
injuries from explosive attacks against railway carriages can be distinguished: 
 One way of decreasing the probability (and the offender’s perception of the 
probability) of an attack with explosives left inside carriage’s being successful 
is to minimize the number of forgotten items: if the design prevents people 
from forgetting items, a left-behind object will be more suspicious and, 
accordingly, more resources will be available to investigate whether the left 
object might be an explosive. It should also be easy for passengers to spot their 
own forgotten luggage when leaving their seat.  
 A second way to decrease the probability (and the offender’s perception of the 
probability) that an attack with explosives left inside the carriage is successful 
is to maximize the ability to spot any left item: if the left item is spotted, 
passengers can alert employees and the employees might thus implement 
suitable responses. Accordingly, the carriage should be designed with no 
hiding places and it should be easy surveillable. 
 A third way to decrease the probability (and the offender’s perception of the 
probability) that an attack with explosives inside the carriage is successful is 
installing explosive detectors at the entrances. An explosives detector is “a 
device capable of detecting the presence of certain types of explosives” 
(Garcia 2008: 331). The current technology is, however, too space demanding 
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(and perhaps also too people intensive) to make it a viable option for now. 
Cost and speed of the current technology also makes the option less viable11
The offender’s perception of his/her cost of attacking depends on his perception of 
the probability of being caught: if an explosive attack is committed by leaving an 
explosive device on site, the preventers’ capability of identifying the offender 
increases the cost of attacking. CCTV can help solve this problem [The fact that in-
carriage CCTV has been deployed to prevent conventional crimes and antisocial 
behaviour gives a ‘free ride’ to the anti-terrorist function].  
.  
Whether an explosive is left before detonation or the offender commits a suicide 
attack, it is desirable to minimize the harm inflicted from an explosive detonated 
inside the carriage. One way of doing this is to minimize injuries from (secondary) 
fragments. Other ways of minimizing human injuries are to reduce the internal blast 
and use materials that do not ignite in an explosion or in a fire. 
In addition to protecting the passengers from an internal blast, the carriage ideally 
should be constructed to withstand external blasts. Current technology, however, can 
only strengthen a carriage structure to withstand small charges or detonations at 
some distance; making a carriage able to withstand a vehicle borne explosive 
crashing into the carriage is not feasible.  
To summarise preventive mechanisms, the ExRes carriage should be specified to 
minimize passenger injuries from explosives by (1) minimizing the number of 
forgotten items; (2) maximizing the surveillability of the carriage; (3) increasing the 
offender’s perception of the probability of being caught; (4) preventing injuries from 
fragments; (5) aiming for a design which absorbs the blast energy from explosives 
detonated internally; and (6) strengthening the carriage structure to withstand an 
externally generated blast (only realistic for small charges or detonations at some 
distance).  There may be additional requirements and assumptions about the security 
of the operating environment that these requirements for the carriage have to dovetail 
with.  
                                                 
11 See explosive-sniffing ticket barriers at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/7305856/New-
Tokyo-train-barriers-test-passengers-for-explosives.html  
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The designers would of course have to simultaneously consider all the other, non-
terrorism requirements of the carriage in its principal function as a conveyance, as 
previously described. 
 
Technicalities 
Describing the technicalities is primarily the designers’ and engineers’ task – where 
they exercise their skill, discipline and creativity to develop, through various 
iteration-and-test procedures,12
In developing technical solutions designers would need to be able to state how the 
causal properties of their design of carriage (in conjunction with influences from 
passengers, luggage, bomb etc) realised each preventive mechanism in terms of 
materials, structure, operation etc, without interfering with the other requirements 
(and maybe actually synergising with them).  They would also have to give an 
account in terms of blocking offender scripts and biasing script clashes to favour 
preventers. There is also the crime-specific possibility of design contradictions 
within the security requirements – for example, bigger windows to facilitate 
surveillance may weaken blast-resistance.  In fact, from the designers’ perspective, 
clearly-stated contradictions serve to sharpen and orientate their thinking (Ekblom 
2008).  
 and practical renditions of requirements such as those 
set out above.  Indeed, stating requirements in such a way as to maximise design 
freedom is important not just as a general principle of industrial design but as a 
specific strategy to keep ahead of adaptive terrorists (Ekblom 2005, 2008). This 
usually relates to ‘performance standards’ rather than ‘construction standards’. 
Some general guidelines may be distinguished from the above discussion13
The number of forgotten items might be minimized by removing storage areas, 
especially areas where it is not evident who owns the luggage like for example shelf 
: 
                                                 
12 e.g. see www.designagainstcrime.com/methodology-resources/design-methodology/#users-abusers 
13 The overview in this section is on the concept level. The feasibility of any technical solution must be 
evaluated through simulation or testing. 
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areas close to the entrances. Ideally, the passengers should keep their luggage on 
their lap or between their feet (if small and light) or close by in their ‘personal space’ 
(if bulky or heavy). The seats should be formed in such a way that anyone leaving 
their seat plus fellow passengers should immediately spot any left item. Ideally all 
seats should face some other seat to maximize passenger surveillance. Design 
contradictions include removing storage areas versus supporting accessibility and 
comfort. For instance, absence of areas to put luggage might force passengers to 
leave it in the walkway such that it hinders movement through the carriage. Absence 
of shelving might also force passengers to keep luggage on the lap and thus decrease 
their comfort. Reducing the number of forgotten items can also have positive 
externalities; forgotten items can cause false alarms which also can reduce 
passengers’ feeling of safety and disrupt services, both of which could deter 
passengers from train travel. 
The surveillability of the carriage can be maximized by removing all unnecessary 
clutter and designing seats and other interior that does not hinder sight more than 
necessary. (Unfortunately, the rush-hour crowding that is so attractive to terrorists 
for boosting their kill, also serves to block this technique.)  Interior walls should be 
transparent and seats designed so they do not unnecessarily decrease surveillability. 
Rubbish bins should ideally be removed (some operators have a rubbish collecting 
service during the journey) or made blast-resistant (which is very expensive). Hiding 
places should be designed out. An important contradiction is minimizing litter bins 
versus passenger comfort. A shortage of bins might cause passengers to throw their 
litter on the floor and, accordingly, decrease cleanliness. A possible solution is to 
increase the frequency of cleaning, but that would also lead to increased operating 
costs. 
The offender’s perception of the probability of being caught after the event (if still 
alive) might be increased by installing CCTV and/or dummy CCTV at all carriage 
entrances – all entrances must appear to be under surveillance or the offender would 
just avoid the unmonitored entrances. The real CCTV-cameras should store all 
pictures and have a high enough picture quality to enable identity recognition of 
offenders. The CCTV coverage should either be immediately stored at an external 
155 
 
server or the storing unit needs to be blast resistant. Installing high quality CCTV 
would however probably increase both the production costs and the operating costs 
drastically. Passenger privacy would also suffer with high density of CCTV 
coverage. 
Injuries from fragments can be prevented by removing clutter that might be 
‘weaponised’, turning  into hazardous fragments in an explosion. Necessary interior 
structures, including glazing, should be blast-resistant or, at least, not form 
dangerous fragments in case of an explosion. This can be done by securing glass and 
using appropriate materials in the interior in an explosion. Internal sectioning might 
also hinder fragments from harming people over a large radius. High passenger 
density will, however, limit the circulation of fragments in itself (albeit unfortunately 
for those passengers nearest the blast).  
Other ways of minimizing human injuries are to reduce the internal blast (to some 
extent) by ensuring rapid and sufficient ventilation of explosive gases, e.g through 
the windows and/or to use materials that do not ignite in an explosion or in a fire. 
Injuries from explosives outside the carriage can be minimized by strengthening 
both carriage walls and carriage floors against external blasts. (Strengthening ribs to 
keep the compartment intact in case of derailment may confer some anti-blast or -
ram benefit incidentally). Strengthening floors and walls might, however, increase 
the weight of the carriages and thus the energy consumed when moving the carriage. 
There is, furthermore, a tradeoff between securing against explosives from external 
and internal blasts; strengthened walls can hinder the ventilation of gases, increase 
the blast reflection and thus the injuries caused by an internal blasts. This is a 
contradiction to challenge designers’ ingenuity. 
In sum, the ExRes carriage’s design should (1) minimize storage areas; (2) remove 
unnecessary clutter and only include interior that does not hinder surveillance more 
than necessary; (3) possibly install CCTV at entrances; (4) only include interior that 
resists fragmentation and fire; (5) ensure rapid and sufficient ventilation of explosive 
gases; and (6) strengthen carriage walls and floors.       
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Summary of SFF description  
The abbreviated four-level description of the security function of the ExRes carriage 
specification translates to:  
1 (Purpose) The ExRes carriage is specified with principal purpose to serve 
as a fully functional and appropriately-adapted railway carriage, and 
subsidiary purpose to minimize passenger injuries from explosives detonated 
either inside or outside of the carriage.   
2 (Security niche) ExRes is above all a securing product: its security function 
is subsidiary to its principal purpose as a conveyance.  As an asset to be 
protected in itself it is also a secured product to the extent it has security 
conferred by external means linked to the carriage and the people within it; 
and a secure product to the extent that it is designed and constructed to 
prevent and resist damage.  It is only to a very limited extent a safe product 
given the difficulty of creating a secure environment around a target as 
geographically extended, complex and accessible to users as the railway. 
 3 (Mechanism) The security function of ExRes is realised by (1) minimizing 
the number of forgotten items; (2) maximizing the surveillability of the 
carriage; (3) increasing the offender’s perception of the probability of being 
caught; (4) preventing injuries from fragments; (5) absorbing the blast energy 
from explosives detonated internally; and (6) strengthening the carriage 
structure such that it can withstand an externally generated blast and thus 
minimize passenger injuries (only realistic for small charges or detonations at 
some distance).   
4 (Technically)These mechanisms may be realised by (1) minimizing storage 
areas; (2) removing unnecessary clutter and only including interior that does 
not hinder sight more than necessary; (3) installing CCTV at entrances; (4) 
only including interior that resist fragmentation and fire; (5) ensuring rapid 
and sufficient ventilation of explosive gases; and (6) strengthening carriage 
walls and floors.   
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5. Assessing the framework 
Section 3 formulated three criteria for the SFF framework: it should be (1) clearly 
expressed, (2) fertile and (3) practically applicable. This section attempts to assess 
the framework’s performance on paper with regard to these criteria.  
 
Clear expression  
Clear expression; requires that SFF should articulate the design problem so as to 
facilitate communication, knowledge transfer and accumulation. It should thus only 
use terms that (1) are easily accessible to all SFF framework users regardless of field 
of expertise and (2) have unambiguous meanings such that all users interpret the 
terms similarly. When introducing new terms, the framework must include 
appropriate guidance on definitions. We include this criterion since each product 
description should be read with a single meaning, and no ambiguity.  
The SFF framework description in section 4 does include clear definitions of the 
terms used, facilitating easier use of the framework. It furthermore distinguishes 
between the different aspects of the product’s purpose and thus forces the designer to 
make explicit all the purposes the product needs to fulfil. In the example of the 
ExRes carriage, the SFF framework highlights the carriage’s security purpose while 
also emphasizing that the carriage’s main purpose is to transport passengers. The 
SFF framework furthermore introduces the term security niche to force the designer 
to formulate how a given product relates to other products, people and places with a 
security function. In the description of the ExRes carriage, the framework shows how 
the ExRes carriage both can be protected as a valued asset and protect people. The 
SFF framework also makes explicit the mechanisms that increase security and helps 
aids the designer in clearly expressing product requirements.  
Hence, the SFF framework is both clearly expressed and aids the designer in 
communicating the design requirements.  
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Fertile  
The second criterion requires that the SFF framework is fertile: it should maximise 
design freedom and creativity so as to facilitate production of new ideas, ideally even 
innovative, ideas which can solve real-world security problems, help out-innovate 
adaptive criminals, and keep up with social and technological change. The ideas 
generated should also be quite plausible and/or assist the designer in filtering out 
ideas with flaws. We include this criterion since we want the SFF framework to 
support the making of new solutions that enhance security.  
The emphasis on mechanisms in the SFF framework aids the designer in thinking 
through different ways of increasing security, systematically pairing old ideas and 
combining them to form new ideas, and thus fosters creativity. However, have any 
completely new ideas been developed through this exercise? The authors do not have 
full overview over which ideas has been developed for enhancing security in 
carriages. We do, however, know that maximizing surveillability, preventing injuries 
from fragments and increasing structural redundancy have elsewhere been used to 
secure buildings against explosives. In rail transport public address messages about 
keeping belongings close, increased CCTV-coverage and increased presence of 
security personnel have been employed, all which can be interpreted as strategies to 
minimize number of forgotten items and increasing the offender’s perception of the 
probability of being caught. We have thus no reason to believe that this exercise has 
resulted in any revolutionary new ideas.  
Hence, the SFF framework may facilitate structured creativity rather than 
fostering completely new ideas. A new award-winning idea would probably depend 
more on a designer’s creativity and posing questions from unusual and original 
angles than a specific framework. But for designers both highly creative and less 
creative, the SFF framework would at least tell them where to focus their thoughts. 
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Practical applicability 
The third criterion requires that the SFF framework is practically applicable; it 
should systematically facilitate spelling out all facets necessary before designing the 
product. It should thus (1) make strong links from purpose to practical product, (2) 
systematically cover an appropriately-wide range of requirements and possibilities, 
and (3) highlight design contradictions, tradeoffs and context-dependencies. We 
include this criterion because we want the SFF framework to contribute to the 
making of physical objects in the messy and complicated real world rather than 
abstract ideas. 
This criterion is difficult to evaluate with regard to the ExRes carriage since no 
designers have endeavoured to realize the specification and no prototype has been 
made. However, the SFF framework facilitates exploring design contradictions when 
discussing technicalities. In the ExRes carriage example, the design contradictions of 
removing storage versus supporting accessibility and comfort and minimizing litter 
bins versus passenger comfort are brought to attention. The SFF framework has 
furthermore been developed in contexts where prototypes have been developed; 
secure bike parking facilities and anti-theft clips to secure customers’ bags to tables 
in bars.  
Hence, the SFF framework seemingly is quite practically applicable.  
 
Summary of self-assessment 
In sum, the SFF framework is clearly expressed and thus aids the designer in 
communicating the design requirements, facilitates systematic creativity without 
necessarily generating completely new ideas and seems practically applicable. But 
these are ‘bench tests’ and there is really no substitute for trying the SFF framework 
out with real live designers. 
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6. Conclusion 
Anyone trying to devise counter-terrorist designs in railway carriages (or anything 
else) faces a range of issues. To help designers through these processes and to build 
their capacity to innovate and communicate in this field, a framework of security is 
needed. The purpose of this paper was twofold: both to explore the specific practical 
problem of designing railway carriages against explosive attacks by terrorists; and to 
assess the benefits of articulating this exploration through the use of a particular 
language and framework, the Security Function Framework (SFF).  
 This paper has presented the SFF framework, applied it to the ExRes carriage and 
evaluated the SFF framework with regard to defined criteria. The evaluation shows 
that the SFF framework is clearly expressed and thus aids the designer in 
communicating the design requirements, facilitates systematic creativity without 
necessarily generating completely new ideas and seems practically applicable. But 
these have been ‘bench tests’ and there is really no substitute for trying the SFF 
framework out with real live designers. 
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